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WEEKLY SUMMARY

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

State Dept. review completed

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C O N T E N T S

(Information as of noon EST, 23 November 1966)

Far East

	<u>Page</u>
VIETNAM	1
Ground fighting in South Vietnam continues to be centered near the Cambodian border in the western highlands and farther south in Communist War Zone "C." The overall pattern of enemy activity in the past few months suggests that the Communist forces are generally on the defensive. They have not attempted to overwhelm a strategic allied outpost since last March and Communist propaganda is increasingly emphasizing the importance of guerrilla warfare. Premier Ky has reassigned the controversial IV Corps commander to the government Ministry of Development and Planning.	
STANDOFF IN PEKING CONTINUES	5
A new move may be afoot to bring down Chief of State Liu Shao-chi and party general secretary Teng Hsiao-ping. Other developments, however, have suggested that Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao were retreating at least temporarily in their drive against opponents in the party.	

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LAOTIAN POLITICAL SITUATION STILL UNSETTLED

8

Neutralist commander Kong Le has resigned, but little has been done toward integrating his forces into the Laotian Army. National assembly elections are still set for 1 January/

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Europe

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SOVIET PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO AUSTRIA

12

President Podgorny reiterated the USSR's opposition to Austria's association with the Common Market but nevertheless left the Austrians hopeful about a more compromising Soviet attitude toward their problems in the future.

BULGARIAN PARTY CONGRESS CONSOLIDATES ZHIVKOV REGIME

12

Zhivkov's chief conservative rival was removed from the party leadership. To promote economic reform, a number of skilled and technically qualified persons were elevated to the party hierarchy.

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REACTIONS TO BRITAIN'S COMMON MARKET BID

14

The five EEC members other than France more than ever want Britain in, but they are wary of De Gaulle's "spoiling moves" and uncertain of their ability to deal with them.

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Middle East - Africa

JORDAN STILL PLAGUED BY ANTIREGIME DEMONSTRATIONS

17

The primary area of unrest is Palestinian west Jordan. Egyptian and Syrian propaganda media are disseminating lurid accounts of the "revolt" to encourage further uprisings against King Husayn.

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TOGOLESE REGIME SURVIVES COUP ATTEMPT

18

President Grunitzky's ability to ride out an attempted coup has strengthened his position but his reliance on army support has been underscored.

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NIGERIAN CRISIS DEEPENS

19

The interregional differences which have been pushing the federation toward fragmentation during the past four months are unabated.

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DISSIDENCE INCREASING IN ETHIOPIA

21

There have been new attacks on government forces by rebels in separatist-minded Eritrea Province, and unrest is increasing among the Galla people in southern Ethiopia. The government has the Galla situation in hand but would find it difficult to contain a threatened two-front operation by the Eritrean rebels.

Western Hemisphere

DUVALIER REMAINS ON TOP AS EXILE INVASION OF HAITI FIZZLES

23

A much-rumored invasion of Haiti by a group of rebels led by Rolando Masferrer collapsed before it could be launched. President Duvalier remains in firm control,

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VENEZUELAN GUERRILLAS DISPLAY RENEWED VIGOR

23

After 18 months of relative inactivity, guerrillas have recently launched new attacks in the western half of the country. They are probably leftist dissidents who oppose the decision of their more orthodox colleagues to subordinate armed struggle to legitimate political activity.

PROGOVERNMENT PARTY GENERALLY VICTORIOUS IN BRAZIL ELECTIONS

25

The progovernment National Renewal Alliance has won substantial majorities in Congress and in most state legislatures which are expected to cooperate with the incoming administration of president-elect Costa e Silva.

POLITICAL TURMOIL CONTINUES IN ECUADOR

26

Efforts to topple provisional president Otto Arosemena are continuing, and his hold on office is weak. His opposition comes mainly from left-of-center groups.

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FAR EAST

VIETNAM

US forces continued to engage North Vietnamese Army (NVA) regulars this week in the central highlands and in Communist War Zone "C" in Tay Ninh Province.

Heavy fighting flared between elements of the 1st NVA Division (formerly the 630th) and units of the ten-battalion US Operation PAUL REVERE IV in the western highlands of Pleiku and Kontum provinces. On 18-19 November US forces reinforced a South Vietnamese patrol which had been attacked about 15 miles west of the Plei Djereng Special Forces Camp near the Cambodian border, killing nearly 175 Communist troops. Several days later, in an area near the Ia Drang Valley about 35 miles southwest of Pleiku city, a North Vietnamese battalion overran the field position of a US platoon. A reaction force killed over 100 of the enemy and suffered casualties of 34 killed and 11 wounded.

Farther south allied forces participating in Operation ATTLEBORO made only light contact with elements of the 5,600-man Viet Cong 9th Division in the area northwest of Tay Ninh city. As the week ended, four US battalions had been withdrawn from Tay Ninh Province for reassignment to other areas.

Over-all Enemy Strategy

The pattern of Communist military activity in South Vietnam during the past few months suggests that allied spoiling operations may be forcing a significant revision in the enemy's strategy. The Communists are no longer seeking to overwhelm strategic allied outposts like Plei Me, as they did last fall. The last such attack--on the Special Forces camp at A Shau in Thua Thien Province--took place in March. Such attacks were partly designed to encourage deployment of a large allied reaction force which would become target for ambush. The Communists found, however, that the growing allied capability to react with overwhelming air and ground firepower made such operations too costly in terms of casualties.

Now the enemy main forces seem to be generally on the defensive. Occasionally when they appeared to be mustering for an attack, allied reaction appears to have disrupted their plans. In the central highlands they seem to be engaged to some extent in a strategy of maneuver. Enemy units continue to move around guardedly, apparently hoping to draw the allied forces

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into short, localized engagements in which the odds are heavily with the Communists. In the past several weeks, they have had some success. Several company-sized or smaller US elements have been hard hit. In each case, however, the Communists have also suffered heavy casualties. Their strategy has, nonetheless, been successful in cutting the over-all attrition rate of their units in the highlands.

Meanwhile, the enemy has begun to put a much greater propaganda emphasis on the guerrilla side of the war. Each day brings new admonitions on the value of hit-and-run raids and terrorist actions as a means of tying down friendly forces and sustaining the Communist grass-roots position in the countryside. So far, the statistics do not indicate a significant increase in guerrilla-type actions throughout South Vietnam; the rate could rise considerably, however, in the coming months.

In the last analysis, the Communists are most interested in maintaining their hold over large portions of the rural populace. They may be hoping to accomplish this largely by guerrilla actions while their main forces threaten large-scale attacks in order to keep the bulk of allied units tied up and unable to concentrate on pacification.

Premier Ky Rearranges Military
And Government Assignments

The reassignment of the controversial IV Corps commander,

General Dang Van Quang, highlighted several changes in the South Vietnamese military command structure on 19 November.

Quang will serve as minister of development and planning, a new cabinet post dealing mainly with long-term postwar planning and economic development. General Nguyen Van Manh, a southerner and a division commander in II Corps, was posted as the new IV Corps commander. Other changes in military assignments included a new chief of staff for the Joint General Staff, a new division commander to replace General Manh, and a reshuffling of several military training commands. The status of Revolutionary Development Minister General Thang and II Corps commander General Loc were also reviewed, although not changed, by the military leadership.

There were no immediate reports of any adverse reaction to Quang's reassignment among southern elements who have been involved in the north-south regional tensions.

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Because of widespread allegations of corruption in the delta area south of Saigon, Quang's removal as IV Corps commander has been rumored for some time.

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As a cabinet minister in Saigon, however, Quang presumably will continue to have some influence in the government, and his reassignment rather than outright dismissal bears the characteristics of a compromise.

Meanwhile, Premier Ky finally announced his cabinet replacements for three of the four southern ministers who resigned because of "police state" tactics and regional discrimination. Ky's three new ministers are all southerners, but without much prestige or proven ability, and his selection of a military officer as youth minister reflects his failure to find a willing southern civilian. In addition, Ky was unable to find a suitable replacement for Economy Minister Thanh, and he now plans to direct economic affairs through a council system rather than through an individual minister. Without consistent policy enforcement by Ky, this important minis-

try may well suffer from a lack of direction and responsibility.

Hanoi Expands East Europe Contacts

Hanoi is continuing to shore up its improved relations with Eastern European Communists. Three separate politburo members are heading delegations to European party congresses--Hoang Van Hoan and Nguyen Duy Trinh have led delegations to Albania and to Bulgaria, and Le Duc Tho will head a delegation at the Hungarian Congress beginning 28 November. Several years ago when the East Europeans were giving less support to Hanoi, a single DRV delegation attended four Eastern European party congresses held at about the same time.

Hanoi is undoubtedly using these visits to make certain it is getting its views on the war across to the East Europeans. The politburo visits may mark a new bid for greater East European political support.

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STANDOFF IN PEKING CONTINUES

An authoritative-looking Red Guard pamphlet displayed on 23 November in Peking demanding the dismissal of chief of state Liu Shao-chi and party general secretary Teng Hsiao-ping suggests a move to bring them down in disgrace. Other recent developments, however, suggested Mao and Lin were retreating at least temporarily in their drive against opponents in the party.

An attempt to discredit the guards for their harassment of party officials seems to have been under way. Numerous wall posters have been appearing in Peking charging that Guards have killed and even tortured to death party officials in Peking and other cities. On 20 November the Peking city party committee--itself the target of recent guard attacks--posted notices warning that Red Guards who set up kangaroo courts and tortured officials would be severely punished.

Peking issued a directive on 16 November ordering all Red Guards visiting Peking to go home by 20 November, and reportedly ordered all trains carrying Red Guards to turn around and return them to their place of origin.

There had been reliable indications as of 10 November that an eighth rally for Red Guards in the series that started in August would be held in Peking in the last ten days of the month. This apparently has been canceled.

Lin Piao's position may have weakened temporarily. Press attention to him has dropped off and he missed the last Red Guard rally held on 11 November, possibly because of illness. He has a long history of frail health, probably the aftermath of tuberculosis. If he has been forced to reduce his activities, this might give his opponents an opportunity to improve their position at his expense.

The positions of two leaders identified with a relatively moderate line in Peking--Premier Chou En-lai and economic planner Li Fu-chun--have been enhanced since about 10 November. The only authoritative regime pronouncement on the cultural revolution issued since early November is a People's Daily editorial on 10 November aimed at protecting the economy from the excesses of cultural revolution. This is a moderate line that has been taken by Chou, but not by Lin Piao.

On 16 November, the same day the Red Guards were ordered home, Peking revealed that Li Fu-chun, whose career has been closely associated with Chou's, is now a member of the elite standing committee of the politburo.

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LAOTIAN POLITICAL SITUATION STILL UNSETTLED

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The political situation in Laos continues unsettled even though the status of the controversial neutralist General Kong Le seems to have been resolved.

Premier Souvanna has accepted Kong Le's resignation as commander of the neutralist forces and the general is scheduled to go abroad indefinitely. The question of integrating his former forces into the Royal Laotian Army (FAR), however, is still in the discussion stage.

FAR generals, meeting in Luang Prabang between 16 and 18 November, agreed that a triumvirate of neutralist colonels should command these forces under the supervision of the FAR General Staff. Souvanna, however, has given no indication of his intentions.

Any move toward integration will give Souvanna a good excuse to close out the military mission the French have maintained in the neutralist camp. His generals have been urging this, or at least a reduction in its size, on grounds that it has exceeded its advisory function and is meddling in purely internal Laotian affairs. One French officer has already been asked to leave.

Souvanna still expects to hold elections for the national assembly on 1 January as scheduled, although some rightist military officers would like more time in which to build support for candidates amenable to their influence.

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SOVIET PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO AUSTRIA

Soviet President Podgorny made no substantive concessions during his visit to Austria last week but left his hosts hopeful about a more compromising Soviet attitude toward their problems in the future. He reiterated the USSR's opposition to Austrian association with the EEC but opened the prospect of greater trade with the USSR. He avoided any threats. The final joint communiqué made no mention of the EEC question.

Podgorny avoided any commitment on a reinterpretation of the 1955 State Treaty which Vienna has long sought in order to acquire defensive missiles, but

said the Soviets are considering the problem at the expert level.

The Soviet President is reported to have complimented Austria on its participation in the East-West "group of nine" along with Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. The group co-sponsored a UN resolution last December on improving East-West relations in Europe and is planning further initiatives in this field.

Both Chancellor Klaus and President Jonas accepted invitations to visit the USSR, and may go next year.

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BULGARIAN PARTY CONGRESS CONSOLIDATES ZHIVKOV REGIME

Bulgaria's ninth party congress, which ended on 19 November, brought first secretary Todor Zhivkov to his strongest position since he assumed power in 1954. In addition to installing many of Zhivkov's supporters in the party's highest organs and removing some of his opponents, the congress enlarged these bodies, continuing the trend started by Zhivkov to add skilled and technically qualified personnel to the hierarchy to promote economic reform.

Zhivkov's strength was demonstrated by the removal of his

rival, politburo member and party secretary Mitko Grigorov. Ironically the conservative Grigorov, as party ideologue, has been forced to take the blame for the rapid penetration of "Western bourgeois influence," especially among the youth, as charged in the Bulgarian press. However, his undisguised ambition for power probably was the major factor contributing to his downfall.

Membership in the politburo increased from 11 to 18 and a secretariat was formally constituted for the first time. Stanko Todorov, an energetic supporter

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of economic reform, was elected party secretary and re-elected to the politburo; he now appears, at only 46, to be the number two man in the hierarchy. The elevation of Ivan Popov, chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technical Progress, to the politburo without prior membership on the central committee is a striking example of the regime's desire to revitalize the leadership.

Speakers at the congress paid the traditional homage to the USSR and gave no indication that Sofia's alliance with Moscow is eroding. Zhivkov committed Bulgaria to complete support of the Soviet Union's anti-Chinese crusade. The regime probably is using this issue to help isolate the dogmatic faction within the party.

As expected, the congress hailed Bulgaria's foreign policy initiatives in the Balkans, and again called for greater cooperation among all Balkan countries. The congress also adopted the ambitious goals of the 1966-70 economic plan.

The ouster of the dogmatic Grigorov may open the door to greater cultural freedom with emphasis, however, on Bulgaria's national heritage and warnings against "bourgeois influences." The Bulgarian people will also be pleased by the regime's efforts to raise the standard of living, increase salaries, and allow greater public voice in the central government's legislation.

CHANGES in BULGARIAN PARTY at 1966 CONGRESS

BEFORE**AFTER****POLITBURO**

Zhivkov, T.
Todorov, S.
Velchev, B.
Bulgaranov, B.
Mikhaylov, I.
Grigorov, M.
Staykov, E.
Zhivkov, Z.

Zhivkov, T.
Todorov, S.
Velchev, B.
Bulgaranov, B.
Mikhaylov, I.
Popov, I.
Dragoycheva, T.
Zhivkov, Z.
Kubadinski, P.
Tsolov, T.
Pavlov, T.

CANDIDATES

Dimov, D.
Kubadinski, P.
Tsolov, T.

Dimov, D.
Avranov, L.
Gyurov, K.
Abadzhiev, I.
Tsanev, A.
Takov, P.
Trichkov, K.

PARTY SECRETARIES

Zhivkov, T., 1st Sec.
Grigorov, M.
Velchev, B.
Bulgaranov, B.
Avramov, L.
Papazov, N.
Prumov, I.

Zhivkov, T., 1st Sec.
Todorov, S.
Velchev, B.
Bulgaranov, B.
Prumov, I.
Kotsev, V.

SECRETARIAT

(New Party Organ)

Zhivkov, T.
Todorov, S.
Velchev, B.
Bulgaranov, B.
Kotsev, V.
Bonev, V.
Gyurov, S.
Vasilev, S.
Prumov, I.

Blue indicates new members
Red indicates members
released from former position

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REACTIONS TO BRITAIN'S COMMON MARKET BID

Prime Minister Wilson's announcement of a serious new UK bid for membership in the European Economic Community has met a cautious response. While there is probably an even greater desire on the part of France's EEC partners now than in 1961 and 1962 to see Britain in the community, they are wary of "spoiling moves" by De Gaulle and uncertain of their ability to deal with them. Moreover, they feel that if they are to confront him on the issue, London must make clear its firm support for the EEC treaty and de-emphasize "safeguards for British interests."

Political conditions in the EEC countries are not especially favorable to Britain's cause. A new government in Bonn may be reluctant to face a showdown with De Gaulle over Britain's entry. The Dutch have only an interim government, and Italy is not likely to take the lead. The parliamentary elections in France next March are a further element of uncertainty.

The French Foreign Ministry is downgrading the "sincerity" of Wilson's approach and emphasizing Britain's possible reservations on the EEC's agricultural policy and difficulties with sterling's international role.

Wilson evidently hopes in bilateral talks with each of the Five to reach agreement on the terms of Britain's accession. This would at least make it more difficult for France to resort to another veto. In the meantime, in an effort to deal with the dilemma posed by the wishes of the Five, De Gaulle's opposition to supranationalism, and conflicting pressures at home, Wilson is attempting to concentrate on the immediate economic issues involved in British EEC membership. In the House of Commons last week, Wilson declined to comment on future political arrangements in Europe going beyond those involved in the EEC.

The prospects are therefore for cautious maneuvering over the next few months, with all the parties aware of the importance of the issues at stake. The basic interests of the Five are probably reflected in a ranking Belgian official's view that Britain's entry would offset recent French negativism and inject new vitality into community institutions.

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MIDDLE EAST - AFRICA

JORDAN STILL PLAGUED BY ANTIREGIME DEMONSTRATIONS

Jordan continues to be plagued by antiregime demonstrations stemming from its poor showing in the face of Israel's 13 November raid. Egyptian and Syrian propaganda media are disseminating lurid accounts of the "revolt" to encourage further uprisings against King Husayn.

The primary area of unrest is Palestinian west Jordan. West Jordan is chronically resentful of Amman's rule and has been the base for most of the Palestinian terrorist activity which precipitated Israel's reprisal.

The town of Nablus is currently the focal point of popular antagonism toward the regime, and demonstrations have been occurring there almost daily. Two battalions of troops reportedly were required to put down a riot there on 21 November in which two civilians were killed.

Trouble has also developed in other towns, including Jerusalem, but Jordanian authorities have thus far been able to maintain control by vigorous action against the demonstrators.

The Palestine Liberation Organization's (PLO) "Voice of Palestine," broadcasting from Cairo, has featured a petition to Husayn by the Nablus mayor and other officials which requests that the government cooperate with the PLO in fortifying Palestinian border villages and arming the inhabi-

tants. The petition also calls upon the government to cease interfering with the operations of the Palestinian terrorists against Israel. The radio claims that popular sentiment in Jordan foreshadows "a comprehensive popular revolution" in all parts of the country.

The semiofficial Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram has attacked Husayn's opposition to the arming of Jordanian Palestinians, calling him a "reactionary ally of Israel" who opposes the PLO and the Palestine nation and strikes it from the rear while Israel attacks it on the border. Cairo radio is highlighting a report that a group of "free Jordanian officers" has formed a revolutionary committee which plans to establish a republic in Jordan to be named Palestine and have Jerusalem as its capital.

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Israel, meanwhile, shows no inclination to take further aggressive action at this time. International criticism of the magnitude of its 13 November raid has prompted the Israelis to claim that the operation went beyond its intended scope.

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SECRET**TOGOLESE REGIME SURVIVES COUP ATTEMPT**

President Grunitzky's success in riding out the 21 November coup attempt against his government will strengthen his position as he tries to deal with Togo's other political problems but it has increased his need to rely on army support.


Following a long period of maneuvering and internal quarrels, the entire cabinet was dismissed on 20 November. Before the coup attempt, Grunitzky had indicated that he hoped--pursuant to his long-

standing goal of reconciliation and national unity--to include representatives of the "true opposition" in a new cabinet. This particular effort now seems out of the question because most of the likely nominees were openly identified with the plotters, and several have been arrested. In other respects, however, Grunitzky's bargaining position with Togo's various political factions has probably improved.

The army, under Chief of Staff Eyadema, has increased its power because of its role as the key factor in Grunitzky's continuation in office. It is still not clear at what point Eyadema decided to give his full backing to the President, nor can it yet be predicted how this volatile soldier will use his influence.

Togo's present civilian government came to power after a military coup in January 1963--in which President Olympio was killed--and has never enjoyed a strong popular base, especially among the more advanced Ewe tribesmen who predominate in the south. Three of the country's four political parties participate in a loose coalition, with the followers of the late Olympio--the group behind the 21 November plot--remaining in opposition. Under Grunitzky, the country has with considerable French support, made modest economic progress, despite his failure to exert strong leadership.

The situation is likely to remain confused for some time. Nevertheless, Grunitzky could rock along as long as the army continues to support his regime.

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SECRET**NIGERIAN CRISIS DEEPENS**

The interregional differences which have been pushing the Nigerian federation toward fragmentation for four months are unabated.

Supreme Commander Gowon last week in effect disbanded the interregional conference on a new constitutional formula and promised to "discuss" with the four regional military governors proposals of his own for constitutional reforms. Gowon attributed his initiative to the inability of the tribal disputants even to agree on a site for the talks, much less resolve substantive differences.

Eastern military governor Ojukwu, whose refusal to send his region's delegates to Lagos had stalled the talks since late October, called Gowon's decision "dictatorial" and promised that the East would resist any attempt to impose a constitution upon it. This makes unlikely any early direct meeting between himself and Gowon.

The East would evidently still accept a loose confederal arrangement, but opposes creation of a federal parliament and is more insistent than ever on preserving its regional integrity. The West, rapidly losing what confidence it had in the federal military government and feeling progressively more estranged from the other regions, has apparently moved close to the East's position. However, the federal government--now controlled by North-

erners--and key spokesmen for minority tribal elements now dominant in the Northern region are holding out for a strong central government and creation of additional states to cope with tribalism in the East and North.

Western military governor Adebayo has publicly denounced a plot to overthrow his government instigated by ex-politicians belonging to the banned Nigerian National Democratic Party (NNDP). He will probably take no action against the NNDP politicians or troops involved in the plot for fear of a reaction from army elements or powerful Northern friends of the plotters. The incident has, however, added strong new impetus to Western pressures for early replacement of troops native to the North by those native to the West.

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Gowon's position remains precarious.

He must soon show some progress toward bringing the East to heel, rehabilitating the army, and tightening up the administration. Northern extremists increasingly urge pre-emptive military action against the East and military elements are impatient to get on with reorganization of the badly shattered army.

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
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SECRET**DISSIDENCE INCREASING IN ETHIOPIA**

The Ethiopian Government is facing new unrest in two areas of the country--the traditionally separatist-minded northern province of Eritrea and in the south among the Galla people.

Following a long period of relative inactivity, the Eritrean

Liberation Front (ELF) early this month carried out coordinated but unsuccessful attacks against security forces in several towns and villages in western Eritrea. Since early fall the ELF has been extending its activities and transferring some of its trained guerrillas to eastern Eritrea, an entirely new area for ELF

ETHIOPIA: Current Areas of Unrest**SECRET**

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operations. This has required the government to divert security forces to that area where the latest reported ELF attack--on a police post near Massawa on 14 November--occurred.

Although the ELF is not yet a serious threat, it is believed to have about 600 disciplined guerrillas. The government would be hard pressed to contain a threatened two-front ELF operation, and has asked the US for helicopters to meet this possible threat.

Unrest has also been growing among the Galla people, the largest ethnic group in the country. Although historically dominated by the ruling Amhara-Tigre people, many Galla hold important government and army positions. The last outbreak of violence among the Galla occurred in early 1965 in Bale Province.

The current unrest in Shawa and Arusi provinces has been prompted by the activities of prominent Galla figures lead by General Tadesse Biru. Tadesse and the others have been trying to politicize the principal Galla tribal association, which Tadesse heads. Political parties are not permitted in Ethiopia, but since September Tadesse and other Gallas have been holding political rallies calling for elections and reforms and stressing Galla unity.

For the moment at least the government seems to have the situation in hand. Except for Tadesse, who is in hiding, the other Galla leaders have been detained. However, should the Galla get any concessions from the Emperor, the 30 to 40 other tribal associations in Ethiopia might also be encouraged to organize for political purposes.

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WESTERN HEMISPHERE

DUVALIER REMAINS ON TOP AS EXILE INVASION OF HAITI FIZZLES

Perennial plotter Rolando Masferrer's oft-postponed invasion of Haiti collapsed before it got off the ground, and President Duvalier's control remains unchallenged.

Rumors of the impending invasion led President Duvalier on 20 November to place all armed forces and civil militia units on general alert. The National Palace security forces--the Presidential Guard and Dessalines Battalion--have been ordered to full mobilization.

Plans of the operation were almost common knowledge in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and in Miami, Masferrer's base of operation.

The US Embassy reported on 21 November that Port-au-Prince was quiet and normal and that there was no information indicating any unusual developments in other parts of the country.

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VENEZUELAN GUERRILLAS DISPLAY RENEWED VIGOR


After 18 months of relative inactivity, Venezuelan guerrillas and terrorists launched a series of attacks in October and November that have cost several lives among security forces personnel. They have also stolen a few machine guns and firearms, some ammunition, and currency. Guerrilla bands have "invaded" and terrorized several villages (see map).

The guerrilla activity was widely dispersed in the western

half of the country. The armed forces have had sporadic contacts with guerrillas there since 1962, but in recent weeks, the guerrillas have become more aggressive.

Urban terrorists operate almost exclusively in Caracas, although on 18 November the Ullé-Amuay pipeline of the US-owned Creole Oil Company was dynamited. Such sabotage was frequent in 1963 but has seldom been reported since then. The renewed violence

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SECRET**VENEZUELA: Locations of Recent Guerrilla Activity**

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probably is the work of small groups led by Douglas Bravo and other dissidents, who resent the efforts of more orthodox leftists to return to legitimate political activity.

The Communist Party (PCV) and the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR)--the principal extremist parties--are both seriously split on the question of abandoning the violent tactics that caused their political

ostracism in 1962. Some PCV and MIR members of the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN) have vowed to continue the "armed struggle" whatever the odds.

President Raul Leoni has accused Fidel Castro of inspiring this recent wave of terrorism. He said Cuba is sponsoring the terrorist bands, and promised to apprehend and prosecute those engaged in such activities.

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PROGOVERNMENT PARTY GENERALLY VICTORIOUS IN BRAZIL ELECTIONS

Election returns from Brazil's congressional elections on 15 November are still incomplete. It appears, however, that the government has obtained cooperative majorities in Congress and in most state legislatures for the incoming administration of president-elect Arthur da Costa e Silva.

Although the progovernment National Renewal Alliance (ARENA) has won substantial victories, the opposition Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) has polled impressive totals in the important states of Guanabara and Rio de Janeiro, and has done well in urban areas of Sao Paulo, Rio Grande do Sul, and Pernambuco.

An important factor in many states was the high percentage of abstentions and blank or invalid votes--in some cases running as high as 50 percent. Although this is in part attributable to widespread public dissatisfaction with the government of President Castello Branco it

also reflects public confusion over complex ballots.

Two important ARENA winners --Carvalho Pinto in Sao Paulo and Magalhaes Pinto in Minas Gerais--are running well ahead of the party tickets. Press and opposition observers are attributing this to the independent stands taken by these candidates and to their frequent criticism of the administration despite their association with the progovernment party.

Aside from some charges of intimidation of opposition candidates and of vote buying in rural areas, the elections are acknowledged to have been properly carried out. The government sparingly used its extraordinary powers to cancel mandates and to void political rights, and its forbearance may help to reduce charges that it is a military dictatorship.

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POLITICAL TURMOIL CONTINUES IN ECUADOR

Ecuador's new provisional president, Otto Arosemena, has succeeded with difficulty in forming a cabinet, but his position remains extremely shaky and he could fall at any time.

Little is known of most of the new ministers. Most of them lean toward conservatism, although it appears that Arosemena has tried to form a government of "national conciliation" by including persons of diverse political views. The foreign minister, Jorge Carrera Andrade, is one of Ecuador's best known leftist intellectuals.

Opposition to Arosemena comes from left-of center political groups, primarily the Liberal Party and Assad Bucaram's Concentration of Popular Forces. In its declaration of "intransigent opposition" to Arosemena, the Liberal Party describes his election as a "shameless alliance among the political right and the economic oligarchy." His stand-

ing has suffered because he gained the presidency by a political deal parlaying his three votes into a majority in the assembly.

The center-left is trying to topple Arosemena by street demonstrations and political double-dealing of its own in the assembly. Demonstrations have tapered off since the weekend of 19-20 November, but more are expected.

The military leaders, meanwhile, are keeping a cautious eye on the deliberations of the assembly

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